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DEAN M. HASHIMOTO· 
Science as Mythology in 
Constitutional Law 
The subject of scientific evidence in the courtroom fascinates legal scholars. Recently, scholars have directed their atten-
tion to the evaluation of scientific facts by trial courts.! Much of 
this rapidly proliferating literature has come in response to 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,2 in which the 
United States Supreme Court interpreted the Federal Rules of 
Evidence to require that trial courts scrutinize scientific informa-
tion before admitting it into evidence.3 The Daubert Court di-
rected trial court judges to assess the reliability of scientific 
evidence by examining specific factors, including rate of error, 
testability, peer review and publication, and general acceptance 
• Assistant Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. B.A., Stanford Uni-
versity, 1976; M.S., University of California, Berkeley, 1979; M.D., University of 
California, San Francisco, 1980; J.D., Yale University, 1984; M.O.H., Harvard Uni-
versity, 1989. I am most grateful for the encouragement and intellectual support of 
my colleague Fred Yen and the unwavering faith of Dean Aviam Soifer. Further-
more, I greatly appreciate those who reviewed an early draft of this essay, including 
Keith Aoki, James Rogers, and Aviam Soifer. Academic Dean George Brown en-
sured that I had the resources to complete this project. Many have willingly partici-
pated in hallway discussions about the subject of this essay, but I must thank 
Anthony Farley and Robert Bloom for their thoughts and encouragement. I also 
thank the participants of a Boston College Law School Faculty Colloquium for their 
commentary on a presentation of the ideas encompassed in this article. Excellent 
research assistance was provided by Stephanie Kaminsky, John Sheridan, Elizabeth 
Stundtner, John Casais, Richard McCormick, and Jennifer Noble. I appreciate the 
financial support from the Boston College Law School Fellows and a Research In-
centive Grant Award from Boston College. 
! This literature is voluminous and rapidly proliferating. See, e.g. , Confronting the 
New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1481 (1995); Bert Black 
et aI., Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for Scientific 
Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REv. 715 (1994); Symposium, Scientific Evidence After the 
Death of Frye, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 1745 (1994). 
2509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
3 See David L. Faigman, Mapping the Labyrinth of Scientific Evidence, 46 HAs-
TINGS L.J. 555,555 (1995) (stating that Daubert directed "judges to actively evaluate 
scientific evidence"). 
[111] 
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by the relevant scientific community.4 Scholars appear, on the 
whole, to approve of the· direction taken by the Court in 
Dauben, and many offer proposals to assist trial courts in scruti-
nizing scientific evidence. 5 Scholars currently devote their atten-
tion, therefore, to analyzing scientific information in the form of 
adjudicative facts that arise directly from the litigation.6 
As important as this recent literature may be, it Jails to con-
sider another significant role for scientific facts: 7 that is, their 
role as legislative facts used to decide questions of law and pol-
icy.8 In contrast with their approach to adjudicative facts, which 
arise directly from litigation, courts may give judicial notice to 
legislative facts from information external to the case at hand. 9 
Despite the current neglect by scholars, prominent professors 
such as Laurence TribelO and Henry Monaghanll have contrib-
uted substantial scholarship that analyzes the significance of leg-
islative facts. This essay is devoted to analyzing how the United 
States Supreme Court uses scientific information as legislative 
4 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-94. 
5 See, e.g., G. Michael Fenner, The Daubert Handbook: The Case, Its Essential 
Dilemma, and Its Progeny, 29 CREIGHTON L. REv. 939 (1996). 
6 See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Admin-
strative Process, 55 HARv. L. REv. 364, 402 (1942). 
7 By "scientific facts," I mean those facts that can be validated, either empirically 
or by observation, through accepted scientific methods. Professor David Faigman 
has adopted a similar definition, although his analysis of scientific facts is largely 
confined to empirical social science data. See David L. Faigman, "Normative Consti-
tutional Fact-Finding": Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 541, 545 n.14 (1991) [hereinafter Faigman, Normative 
Constitutional Fact-Finding] (legal relevance of scientific fact should depend on va-
lidity); David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social 
Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005,1009 (1989) [hereinaf-
ter Faigman, Value of Social Science] ("The legal relevance of social science findings 
should depend on their scientific strength .... "). 
8 See Davis, supra note 6, at 403. 
91d. 
10 Professor Tribe is wary of allowing empirical facts to inform legal decision-mak-
ing. See generally Laurence H. Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins of Straining the Constitu-
tion Through a Pseudo-Scientific Sieve, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 155, 156 (1984). 
11 The leading article on the role of appellate review in the context of constitu-
tional facts is Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 
229 (1985). Professor Monaghan contends that the pressing question is the extent to 
which the Constitution controls the allocation of factfinding functions. In his view, 
"constitutional fact review at the appellate level is a matter for judicial (and legisla-
tive) discretion, not a constitutional imperative." Id. at 238. Thus, appellate courts 
should not be required to review every application of settled constitutional norms to 
the historical facts. Appellate courts may be mandated to declare law, but not to 
determine the application of facts. Id. at 239. 
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facts in constitutional law opinions. In modem times, the Court 
has often referred to empirical or scientific data that serve as leg-
islative facts within its opinions.12 The Court has grappled with 
scientific information on a wide array of constitutional problems 
including the death penalty,13 equal protection,14 right to a jury 
trial,15 church and state relations, 16 limits on police search and 
seizure,17 and other issues.1s Legal scholars believe that this phe-
nomenon developed during the past century. 19 
In this Article I analyze this recent phenomenon and explain 
how the Court has relied on scientific facts. In Part I, I describe 
how legal scholars analyze the functions of scientific legislative 
facts. Many scholars emphasize the evidentiary function of scien-
tific facts.2o They presume that the Court relies on scientific in-
formation as factual evidence in its decision-making?1 I also 
describe in Part I how other scholars take an additional step in 
claiming that the Court's use of scientific facts amounts to an in-
terpretive methodology. Some scholars believe that judges have 
12 Paul S. Appelbaum, The Empirical Jurisprudence of the United States Supreme 
Coun, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 335, 335 (1987) ("The U.S. Supreme Court ... has 
increasingly relied upon data-based arguments."); Rachal N. Pine, Speculation and 
Reality: The Role of Facts in Judicial Protection of Fundamental Rights ,136 U. PA. L. 
REv. 655, 658-62 (1988) (describing the growing use of empirical facts after the be-
ginning of the twentieth century). 
13 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (dismissing constitutional 
claims based on the Baldus study, a large empirical study showing disparities in the 
imposition of the death penalty based on the murder victim's and defendant's race); 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 291-301 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (discuss-
ing the deterrent effectiveness and popular acceptance of the death penalty). 
14 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,200-01 (1976) (finding gender bias after 
criticizing the statistical evidence relied on by the State of Oklahoma); San Antonio 
Independent Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,14-16 n.38 (1973) (citing to statisti-
cal studies which supported the lack of discrimination in administering school re-
sources to the poor). For my analysis of Boren, see Dean M. Hashimoto, Justice 
Brennan's Use of Scientific and Empirical Evidence in Constitutional and Adminis-
trative Law, 32 B.C. L. REv. 739,745-47 (1991). 
15 See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100-02 (1970) (considering empirical 
data concerning differences between six- and twelve-person juries). 
16 See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (creationism does not con-
stitute a scientific theory). 
17 E.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907-08 n.6 (1984) (citing several social 
science studies for support). 
18 See generally Hashimoto, supra note 14; Appelbaum, supra note 12; Faigman, 
Norrnative Constitutional Fact-Finding, supra note 7; Pine, supra note 12. 
19 Pine, supra note 12, at 658. 
20 See, e.g., id.; Appelbaum, supra note 12. 
21 See, e.g., Pine, supra note 12, at 662 ("[T]he Supreme Court has relied upon 
social facts presented either through expert testimony, 'Brandeis briefs,' or judicial 
notice. "); Appelbaum, supra note 12. 
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relied on empirical research in the same way that they have re-
lied on legal analysis.22 In their view, the Court has not actually 
followed the traditional distinction between facts and law; in-
stead, it uses scientific facts in the same way that it uses legal 
precedent. 
In Part II, I contend that scholars tend to overemphasize the 
Court's logical reliance on scientific facts and to understate the 
Court's reliance on facts for rhetorical purposes. 23 In that part, I 
also demonstrate that the traditional distinction between law and 
fact retains its vitality in the present. The Federal Rules of Evi-
dence treat legislative facts in particular ways in order to recog-
nize, at least implicitly, that courts frequently use them for purely 
rhetorical purposes. While scholars claim that the Court's recita-
tion of scientific facts indicates that it is using this information in 
its decision-making, this thesis does not explain their own obser-
vations about the way the Court conveys this scientific informa-
tion in its opinions. The Court has not developed a sophisticated 
or consistent methodology in analyzing scientific information.24 
It also has a tendency to be result-oriented in deciding which sci-
entific facts to include and in what manner they should be used.25 
In its jurisprudence, the Court has failed to follow scientific in-
formation wherever it may lead.26 If the Court truly relied on 
scientific evidence in its decision making, it would not perpetuate 
such usage. Finally, in Part II, I demonstrate the undesirability of 
heavy reliance on empirical facts for decision-making purposes in 
constitutional law. These reasons suggest that the Court should 
explicitly emphasize the rhetorical use of scientific facts over 
their evidentiary or interpretive uses. In Part III, I further illus-
22 John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and 
Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 477 (1986). 
23 I do not claim that scientific facts serve only a mythic function. I recognize 
that, to a limited extent, scientific facts inform constitutional decision-making. How-
ever, I believe that by and large the Court uses scientific facts for rhetorical and 
metaphorical purposes and not for evidentiary or interpretive purposes. 
24 See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Shaman, Constitutional Fact: The Perception of Reality by 
the Supreme Coun, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 236, 237 (1983) ("Throughout its history, the 
Court has devoted little attention to developing proper methodology to deal with 
constitutional facts."). 
25 See Donald N. Bersoff & David J. Glass, The Not-So Weisman: The Supreme 
Coun's Continuing Misuse of Social Science Research, 2 U. em. ROUNDTABLE 279, 
293 (1995). 
26 See, e.g., William E. Doyle, Can Social Science Data Be Used in Judicial Deci-
sion-making?, 6 J.L. & Eouc. 13, 16 (1977) (noting that the progeny of Brown v. 
Board of Education failed to be predicated on social science studies). 
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trate the Court's reliance on scientific facts for rhetorical pur-
poses by analyzing cases on which scholars rely to demonstrate 
their claims about the Court's logical use of scientific facts. 
In Part IV, I compare the Court's rhetorical use of scientific 
facts with the functions and characteristics of mythology. Plato 
emphasized the distinction between mythos, which is persuasive 
storytelling, and logos, which is an accurate account. 27 As 
Mircea Eliade explained, "'[M]yth ... is not an explanation in 
satisfaction of a scientific interest' .... [Instead,] it expresses, 
enhances, and codifies belief .... " 28 Furthermore, mythology 
serves to reinforce the social order by demonstrating that this 
social order is the result of a natural phenomenon?9 Scholars of 
mythology have described characteristics of myth to include the 
inseparability of fact and value,3° the emphasis on persuasion 
over truth,31 and the sacred voice of the storyteller.32 
In Part IV, I explain more fully how the Court uses scientific 
facts as mythology in constitutional law opinions. 33 Because of 
the countermajoritarian function of the Court, it must rely heav-
ily on persuasion.34 Unlike executive orders or congressional 
legislation, judicial opinions articulate legal rules in the form of 
narratives containing diverse facts-some of which may be in-
cluded for rhetorical reasons rather than as mere reportage of 
27 See Ernest J. Weinrib, Law as Myth: Reflections on Plato's Gorgias, 74 IOWA 
L. REv. 7f57, 789 (1989); Marlena G. Corcoran, The Last Judgment of Plato's Gor-
gias: Mythos to You, Logos to Me, 74 IOWA L. REv. Fa7 (1989). 
28 MIRCEA ELIADE, MYTII AND REALITY 20 (Willard R. 1i'ask trans., 1963). 
29 See STEPHEN C. AUSBAND, MYTH AND MEANING, MYTII AND ORDER 1-5 
(1983). 
30 See LAWRENCE HATAB, MYTH AND PmLOSOPHY: A CONTEST OF TRUTHS 309 
(1990) ("collapse of the fact-value distinction"); LEsZEK KOLAKOWSKI, THE PRES-
ENCE OF MYTII 26 (1989). 
31 See HATAB, supra note 30, at 35-36. 
32 See ERNST CASSIRER, 2 THE PmLOSOPHY OF SYMBOLIC FORMS 74 (Ralph 
Manheim trans., 1955) (noting that myth is neither subjective nor objective, but tran-
scendent and "sacred"). 
33 The literature about law and mythology is sparse. This Article offers an original 
perspective by comparing legislative facts to myths. Other scholars have compared 
the legal system as a whole to mythology. See PETER FITZPATRICK, THE MYTHOL-
OGY OF MODERN LAW (1992) (comparing law to mythology); Vladimir J. Konecni & 
Ebbe B. Ebbesen, The Mythology of Legal Decision Making, 7 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHI-
ATRY 5 (1984); Robert D. Taylor, Reclaiming Our Roots: Law and Mythology, 29 
DUQ. L. REv. 271 (1991). Most scholars use the word "mythology" as synonymous 
with "fiction"; in part IV, infra, I rely on a more comprehensive definition of 
mythology. 
34 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
CoURT AT THE BAR OF POLmcs 16-28 (Yale Univ. Press 1986) (1962). 
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how the Court went about deciding the legal issues. By reciting 
scientific facts, the Court shows why its rulings are in harmony 
with a culture that accords legitimacy to findings made by scien-
tists. The Court's use of scientific facts to justify the establish-
ment or continuation of a social order resembles the use of 
mythology by storytellers in primitive societies. Furthermore, 
the characteristics of mythology may explain many scholarly ob-
servations describing the manner in which the Court uses scien-
tific facts. First, the Court's result-oriented use of scientific facts 
is consistent with the inseparability of the roles of facts and val-
ues in mythology. The Court is likely to find useful only those 
facts that illuminate the values being espoused. Second, from the 
standpoint of effective mythology, the manner in which scientific 
facts fit into the Court's explanation becomes more important 
than the absolute accuracy of particular facts. The Court's care-
less use of science results from emphasizing rhetoric over accu-
racy. Third, our society holds scientific information in high 
esteem. Science is enshrouded in an air of the sacred similar to 
that which surrounds myths. Science serves a central mythic 
function in constitutional law opinions. 
I 
THE LoGICAL FUNCTIONS OF SCIENTIFIC FACTS 
Scholars articulate two major functions of scientific evidence in 
constitutional law opinions. Most emphasize that scientific evi-
dence informs constitutional interpretation by providing a factual 
basis for decision-making. This view accepts the formal distinc-
tion between law and fact. Because the Court often resorts to 
balancing various interests to decide constitutional issues, scien-
tific evidence provides information that the Court uses to assign 
the appropriate weight to the particular interests being consid-
ered. Recently, some scholars have advocated a different view of 
the role of scientific facts in constitutional law. They contend 
that the Court's use of scientific facts indicates that the tradi-
tionallaw/fact distinction has dissolved. According to this view, 
scientific facts may serve as legal authority. 
A. The Law/Fact Distinction 
The scholarly literature describing the evidentiary and inter-
pretive functions of scientific facts flows from the legal realist 
movement's reinterpretation of the law/fact distinction. Legal 
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realists focused on the impact of facts on legal results and argued 
in favor of the collapse of this formal distinction. Before describ-
ing the functions of scientific facts, I briefly survey the history of 
the law/fact distinction. In the nineteenth century, a central tenet 
of classical jurisprudence was based on the law/fact distinction. 
James Bradley Thayer published a definition of this distinction in 
his book A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common 
Law.35 According to Professor Thayer, questions of law in-
volved the judicial selection of pertinent legal rules, while ques-
tions of fact involved determinations by the factfinder about 
particular facts relevant to the legal case at hand.36 Classical ju-
risprudence characterized law as resulting from judicial selection 
of a correct legal solution by the rational application of logic in-
volving natural principles.37 Thayer further described law as per-
manent and of general application. 38 Alternatively, he 
characterized facts as transitory and particular and thus, in the 
words of one commentator, not "worthy of the dignity of the 
name, law."39 
Because legal realists believed that judges made law based on 
their general knowledge, they questioned the absoluteness of the 
law/fact distinction. Legal realists recognized that the judicial as-
sessment of facts-not just of legal principles-may actually de-
cide or shape the legal rule.40 Professor Kenneth Culp Davis 
relied on this insight to describe a distinction between adjudica-
tive and legislative facts. He defined adjudicative facts as those 
associated with the particular legal dispute.41 Adjudicative facts 
are the descriptions of what existed in the past and are found in 
35 JAMES B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE CoMMON 
LAW 183-262 (Augustus M. Kelly ed., 1969) (1898). 
361d. 
37 See Monahan & Walker, supra note 22, at 479. 
38 See Clarence Morris, Law and Fact, 55 HARV. L. REv. 1303, 1315 (1942). 
39 See id. 
40 See Monahan & Walker, supra note 22, at 483; Peggy C. Davis, "There Is a 
Book Out . .. ": An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. 
L. REv. 1539, 1539 (1987). 
41 See Davis, supra note 6, at 402. Although Davis focused on administrative law, 
he noted that 
[t]he distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts apparently has 
been clearly recognized ... in constitutional cases, in which a category of 
'constitutional facts' has emerged. Often referred to as 'social and eco-
nomic data,' constitutional facts are those which assist a court in forming a 
judgment on a question of constitutional law. 
Id. at 403. 
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the trial record.42 The trial process constitutes an inquiry-retro-
spective and discrete in nature-that reveals such factual descrip-
tions.43 Examples of adjudicative facts in Brown v. Board of 
Education44 included findings by the trial courts of the four con-
solidated cases that the schools had been equalized with respect 
to buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of teachers, and 
other tangible factors.45 Similarly, adjudicative facts in Roe v. 
Wade 46 included the description of a woman with a pseudonym 
of Jane Roe as an unmarried and pregnant woman unable to ob-
tain an abortion because it would be illegal in Texas and because 
she could not afford to travel to another jurisdiction where the 
procedure was legal.47 Adjudicative facts therefore arise from 
the litigation and concern past events relevant to legal cases. 
Alternatively, judges rely on legislative facts to decide ques-
tions of law and policy.48 A legislative fact may show the general 
impact that a court ruling would have on society. Legislative 
facts tend to predict future occurrences and to support general-
izations about the potential impact of legal rules.49 A party may 
include a legislative fact in a brief or submit it as evidence in a 
trial with the hope that such a showing will encourage a court to 
make a particular legal ruling. 50 Moreover, a judge may recog-
nize legislative facts through judicial notice.51 The famous legis-
lative fact in Brown v. Board of Education was the Court's 
observation that segregation of children in public schools causes 
a sense of inferiority that affected their ability to learn. 52 Thus, 
the Court concluded that segregation inherently resulted in une-
qual treatment. 53 An important legislative fact to the Court in 
Roe was the finding that fetal viability usually occurs between 
42 See Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial Reception of Legislative Facts, 41 
VAND. L. REv. 111, 113 (1988). 
43 See id. 
44 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
451d. at 486-88 n.1. 
46 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
47 See id. at 120. 
48 Davis, supra note 6, at 402. 
49 Woolhandler, supra note 42, at 114. 
SOld. 
51 Professor Davis noted that an appellate judge may be exposed to legislative 
facts through the trial court adjudication, briefs by parties, or judicial notice. Davis, 
supra note 6, at 403. 
52 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
53 ld. at 495. 
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twenty-four and twenty-eight weeks.54 The Court used this fact 
in defining where the state's interest in potential life became 
compelling.55 The Court uses legislative facts to justify legal 
rules that have ramifications beyond the particular case which it 
is resolving. 
A method of constitutional interpretation that relies on factual 
information is the balancing test. This form of constitutional rea-
soning "has become widespread, if not dominant, over the last 
four decades. "56 In balancing, the Court focuses on each interest 
and makes comparisons between competing interests.57 When 
the Court relies on a balancing test, it uses legislative facts to 
decide on the proper choice of legal rules. Adjudicative and leg-
islative facts differ primarily in their functions rather than their 
characteristics as particular versus general facts.58 In applying a 
balancing test, the Court uses legislative facts to create rules; it 
then relies on adjudicative facts in applying the chosen rules to 
the case at hand. 
Davis contends that the categorization of a fact as adjudicative 
or legislative should have procedural consequences. 59 In essence, 
he believes that legislative facts should be treated in certain re-
spects as similar to legal rules, while adjudicative facts should be 
treated in the traditional way. It was appropriate to continue the 
legal tradition of presenting adjudicative facts to factfinders such 
as juries for decision-making; by contrast, legislative facts are 
presented to judges in their capacity as lawmakers.60 Similarly, 
while appellate courts should freely reexamine judicial findings 
of legislative facts as they would findings of law, they should con-
tinue to accord factfinders at the trial court level reasonable dis-
cretion in their findings of adjudicative facts.61 The Federal 
Rules of Evidence eventually incorporated Professor Davis' 
54 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973). 
55 See id. at 163. 
56 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE 
L.J. 943, 943-44 (1987). 
57 See id. at 945. 
58 See Woolhandler, supra note 42, at 114. 
59 Kenneth Culp Davis, Facts in Lawmaking, 80 CoLUM. L. REv. 931, 940-41 
(1980). 
601d. 
61 According to the advisory committee note in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
the appellate court may either perform its own independent research of legislative 
facts or remand to the trial court the task of finding legislative facts. See FED. R. 
EVID. 201(a} advisory committee's note; see also Monahan & Walker, supra note 22, 
at 486. 
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conclusions.62 
Although Davis recognized that facts can play two distinct 
roles in legal decision-making, he preserved the traditional facti 
law distinction. Professors John Monahan and Laurens Walker 
have observed that: 
in distinguishing "legislative" from "adjudicative" fact, Davis 
perpetuated the old pre-Realist boundaries of the distinction 
between "fact" and "law." He left the classification of empiri-
cal information as fact, and merely divided the category of fact 
into two subcategories, one of which (legislative) reflected the 
Realist position that judges make law. The procedural ramifi-
cations emanating from Davis's tacit acceptance of the manner 
in which classical jurisprudence separated fact and law have 
been limited to the largely negative proposal that facts used to 
create a rule of law are not to be treated as other facts are 
treated in court. This view fails to provide clear direction re-
garding how courts should obtain social science data, and con-
tains no information about how courts should evaluate what 
they have obtained, or what effect they should give to the eval-
uation of other courtS.63 
Despite this kind of criticism, the position taken by Davis has 
achieved widespread acceptance.64 Thus, the law/fact distinction 
retains its vitality in the present day. 
B. The Evidentiary Function 
Most scholars who have examined the role of scientific evi-
dence in constitutional law focus on how scientific information-
in the form of legislative facts-serves an evidentiary function.65 
They believe that the Court relies on scientific information in its 
decision-making to assist its quest for truth.66 While adhering to 
the factllaw distinction, they recognize that scientific legislative 
62 Federal Rule of Evidence 201 contains this distinction between legislative and 
adjudicative facts. FED. R. EVID. 201. See United Air Lines v. Civil Aeronautics 
Bd., 766 F.2d 1107, 1118 (7th Cir. 1985). 
63 Monahan & Walker, supra note 22, at 485. 
64Id. at 484 & n.25. 
65 See, e.g., John M. Conley, "The First Principle of Real Reform": The Role of 
Science in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 65 N.C. L. REv. 935 (1987); David M. 
O'Brien, The Seduction of the Judiciary: Social Science and the Courts 64 JUDICA· 
TURE 8, 9 (1980) (examining ways that the social sciences contribute to judical deci-
sion-making); Richard Lempert, "Between Cup and Lip": Social Science Influences 
on Law and Policy, 10 L. & POL'y 167, 169 (1988) (examining whether and how 
much social science influences judicial decision-making); Jeffrey M. Shaman, Consti-
tutional Fact: The Perception of Reality by the Supreme Court, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 
236, 236-37 (1983) (discussing judicial reliance on constitutional facts). 
66 See, e.g., Pine, supra note 12, at 661-63. 
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facts influence constitutional decision-making. For example, civil 
rights attorney Rachal N. Pine examines the role of empirical leg-
islative facts on constitutional decision-making and argues in 
favor of their usage to advance the protection of fundamental 
rights. 67 
Pine argues that courts should be receptive to empirical infor-
mation pertinent to constitutional analysis. 68 She analyzes the 
potential role of scientific information in "operational chal-
lenges" to the constitutionality of law.69 In operational chal-
lenges, the plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of a statute 
based on its operational impact throughout the effective period 
of the law.7o Pine observes that courts presently reject opera-
tional challenges based on information disproving the factual ba-
ses for constitutional decisions by the Supreme Court. Courts 
reject these challenges because they consider the factual bases of 
earlier Supreme Court opinions to be legislative facts binding on 
lower courts and not subject to dispute?1 Pine challenges the 
wisdom of this doctrine and argues that lower courts should be 
allowed to decide on the validity of factual assumptions made by 
the Supreme Court.72 
Pine relies on Hodgson v. Minnesota as the most important 
example of this phenomenon.73 In a series of cases prior to this 
litigation, the Court had upheld a state statute requiring parental 
notification or consent if a minor wished to have an abortion pro-
vided that there was an adequate waiver procedure.74 Pine ar-
gues that the factual bases for these Supreme Court decisions 
turned out to be incorrect based on empirical studies conducted 
67Id. 
68 Id. at 657. 
69Id. 
70Id. at 702. Operational challenges appear to be a hybrid of "facial" and "as 
applied" challenges. In facial challenges to legislation, the plaintiffs must show that 
no set of circumstances exist under which the legislation can be constitutionally 
valid. Id. at 698. In challenges to legislation as applied, the plaintiffs assert that the 
law as applied is unconstitutional. Id. at 701. In contrast with applied challenges, in 
operational challenges plaintiffs are seeking across-the-board relief. Furthermore, 
an operational challenge is not equivalent to a facial challenge because facial validity 
may have already been adjudicated. See id. at 702-03. 
71Id. at 696. This view is consistent with Professor Davis' view discussed supra 
notes 41-55 and accompanying text. 
72Id. at 697-98. 
73 Id. at 679. 
74 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 
(1981); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 
(1983); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983). 
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subsequent to these decisions.15 She states: 
A growing body of psychological and medical research has 
confirmed what the [trial] court in Hodgson found: the harm 
imposed on minors by mandatory parental involvement laws 
cannot be justified by any of the asserted state interests be-
cause these interests have turned out to be based more on 
cliche and folklore than on empirical fact. For example, con-
trary to the assumptions made by both legislatures and courts, 
by all available measures minors are on average indistinguish-
able from adults in their ability to understand and reason 
about health care alternatives?6 
Pine also notes other factual assumptions made by the Court that 
had been disproved empirically. These included the safety of the 
abortion procedure77 and the advantage of parental input into 
the decision-making by adolescents. 78 She argues that because 
empirical studies had disproven the Court's factual conclusions, 
litigants should be allowed to challenge the validity of the 
Court's decisions in the lower COurtS.79 Yet lower courts, includ-
ing the trial court in Hodgson, dismissed challenges based on 
new empirical information.8O 
In summary, Pine believes that the Court relies on scientific 
facts as a guide to constitutional· law. She assumes that the 
Court's inclusion of empirical facts within its opinions means that 
such facts influence the Court's legal decision-making. Pine 
points to the Supreme Court's incorrect empirical assumptions 
and contends that the Court's reliance on legislative facts should 
be subject to subsequent challenge in lower courts if later empiri-
cal studies demonstrated the invalidity of those legislative facts. 
Pine thus conceives of the scientific information as serving an im-
portant evidentiary function in the Court's decision-making. 
C. The Interpretive Function 
Some scholars argue that scientific facts have become so im-
portant to judicial decision-making that the factllaw distinction 
has dissolved.81 They contend that the Court's evaluation of sci-
75 Pine, supra note 12, at 688-93. 
76Id. at 687-88 (emphasis added). 
77 Id. at 690. 
78Id. at 691-92. 
79Id. at 718-19. 
80 Id. at 696-97. 
81 The two most notable articles advancing this contention are Monahan and 
Walker, supra note 22, and Faigman, Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding, supra 
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entific facts has become an interpretive method in constitutional 
law. In this view, the Court's use of such facts serves functions 
similar to other traditional interpretive methods that rely on con-
stitutional text, original intent, or precedent. This phenomenon 
may have resulted from the legal realists' contention that a good 
legal rule should be one that causes a desirable social result.82 In 
an age of pragmatic balancing, a legal realist may advocate that a 
legal rule should be changed if it can be shown empirically that it 
will not advance its intended objective, that it will cause harm, or 
that another rule better achieves the desired result.83 
Professor David Faigman offers a detailed analysis contending 
that the Court's use of empirical facts constituted an interpretive 
method which he termed "normative constitutional fact-find-
ing."84 He believes that science strengthens the role of factfind-
ing in a special way that guides and restrains the Court's 
constitutional discretion.85 This kind of constitutional factfind-
ing, according to Faigman, constitutes a type of interpretation 
that is as important as reliance on other interpretive methods 
that look to constitutional text, original intent, and precedent.86 
Faigman acknowledges that most constitutional factfinding in 
the past relied on the Court's "best guess" on any given factual 
matter.87 For example, in Gibbons v. Ogden, the Court made the 
empirical statement (without empirical support) that "[a]ll 
America understands, and has uniformly understood, the word 
'commerce,' to comprehend navigation."88 Faigman acknowl-
edges that Chief Justice Marshall's assertion in Gibbons served 
only a rhetorical purpose. Although it lent support to the 
Court's definition of the word "commerce," it was not necessary 
for the Court's conclusion.89 Faigman therefore concludes that 
note 7. Both articles contend that the Court's use of empirical fact in constitutional 
law resembles its reliance on legal interpretation and calls for the abolishment of the 
traditionallaw/fact distinction. They argue in favor of recognition and formalization 
of this new interpretive method. Professors Walker and Monahan have also written 
a second article arguing that scientific methodology, rather than factual applications, 
should constitute legal precedent. Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Facts: 
Scientific Methodology as Legal Precedent, 76 CAL. L. REv. tr77 (1988). 
82 See Woolhandler, supra note 42, at 115. 
83 Id. at 116. 
84 Faigman, Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding, supra note 7, at 544-45. 
85 Id. at 545. 
86 Id. at 543-44. 
87 Id. at 545. 
88 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
89 Faigman, Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding, supra note 7, at 546. 
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even empirical evidence to the contrary would not have changed 
the result.90 
Faigman observes, however, that the Court's traditional 
factfinding approach based on such casual "best guesses" has 
changed substantially because litigants now introduce contempo-
rary scientific studies into constitutional litigation.91 These em-
pirical studies may cast doubt on any best guesses by the Court, 
and thus they serve to exert a strong restraining influence. 92 
Faigman acknowledges the Court's tendency to use scientific 
facts only to bolster its results, and not to dictate them.93 He 
rejects, however, the conclusion by most scholars that the Court 
is disingenuous in behaving in this manner because "the Court 
cites empirical research when it fits the Court's particular needs, 
but eschews it when it does not." 94 Faigman believes that scien-
tific facts influence constitutional interpretation even when the 
Court does not rely on them because such facts force the Court 
to justify whatever result is reached.95 
What is striking about this literature is the preoccupation of 
scholars with the presumed logical usage of scientific facts; that 
is, they assume that the inclusion of facts in a judicial opinion 
indicates that those facts actually played an important role in the 
logic of constitutional decision-making.96 These scholars pre-
sume that when scientific facts appear in judicial opinions, the 
Court is thereby signifying that it logically relied on the empirical 
information in the course of its decision-making. Scholars make 
this assumption without exploring other possibilities. In Part II, I 
argue that in fact the Court's predominant usage of scientific 
facts is not compatible with this assumption by scholars. Instead, 
the Court's predominant usage is more consistent with reliance 
on scientific facts for rhetorical or metaphorical purposes. 
90 ld. 
911d. at 547-49. 
92ld. at 548-49. 
931d. at 549 & n.27. 
94ld. 
951d. at 550. I disagree with Professor Faigman's analysis of the Court's use of 
scientific materials. See infra notes 257-63 and accompanying text. 
96 See supra note 27 and accompanying text (referring to Plato's distinction be-
tween logos and mythos). 
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II 
THE RHETORICAL FUNCTION OF SCIENTIFIC FACTS 
Plato emphasized an important distinction between two types 
of narratives: mythos and logos. To characterize a narrative as 
logos means to accept it as a true account.97 Scholars tend to 
perceive the Court's inclusion of scientific facts in its opinions as 
a literal description of the role of that information in its decision-
making. I propose, however, that the predominant role of scien-
tific facts in constitutional law opinions may be better under-
stood in terms of myth. The Court uses scientific facts for mainly 
persuasive purposes. The Court finds scientific facts to be useful 
rhetorically because our society associates certain values, such as 
objectivity and neutrality, with scientific information. I arrive at 
this conclusion after critiquing the deficiencies in the present 
scholarly literature. 
I critique the current literature in three ways. First, despite 
suggestions to the contrary, the legal system still hews to the 
traditional law/fact distinction, which preserves the judicial dis-
cretion necessary to allow courts to use facts in a purely persua-
sive way. Second, the Court's persistent, careless, and result-
oriented use of scientific facts is more consistent with rhetorical 
reliance. Despite numerous proposals by scholars to require 
courts to scrutinize scientific facts more carefully and the appar-
ent ease with which this could be accomplished, the evidentiary 
rules regarding legislative facts continue to provide for unregu-
lated judicial factfinding of legislative facts. Third, the Court 
may believe it unwise to rely heavily on scientific facts in a logical 
way in its constitutional decision-making. The Court therefore 
may rely more heavily on the rhetorical use of scientific facts be-
cause it is simply the more effective approach. 
A. The Continued Reliance on the Law/Fact Distinction 
The law/fact distinction retains its vitality. The law/fact distinc-
tion has not disappeared because some scholars incorrectly as-
sume that legislative facts have largely been incorporated into 
the role of lawmaking. They believe, therefore, that scientific 
factfinding may constitute a distinct interpretive method. The 
97 See Weinrib, supra note 27, at 789; Corcoran, supra note 27, at 827-28; see also 
Richard K. Sherwin, A Matter of Voice and Plot: Belief and Suspicion in Legal Story-
telling, 87 MICH. L. REv. 543, 574 (1988). 
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legal system keeps the law/fact distinction intact, however, be-
cause the Court primarily makes rhetorical use of scientific legis-
lative facts. The preservation of the law/fact distinction remains 
important because complete dissolution would lead to at least 
three practical and legal problems. 
First, with the dissolution of the law/fact distinction, stricter 
regulation would probably be imposed on legislative factfinding 
because of its lawmaking function. For example, the Court in 
Daubert provided scientific criteria to evaluate the admissibility 
of adjudicative facts.98 If evaluation of scientic facts were also 
central to legislative factfinding, then we would expect that simi-
lar criteria would be applied. The Court, however, would find it 
more difficult to rely on its scientific rhetoric if the Court's use of 
all scientific facts were regulated under stringent procedural and 
accuracy requirements. The Federal Rules of Evidence do not 
regulate legislative fact information. An Advisory Committee 
Note states that courts should be allowed to initiate an independ-
ent search for legislative facts and take judicial notice of these 
facts.99 Professor Davis describes this as a rule of convenience: 
"The reason we allow judicial notice to be taken of extra-record 
[legislative] facts is ... to promote convenience. Tribunals make 
factual assumptions because it is convenient to do so. Indeed, to 
fail to make factual assumptions would mean extreme inconven-
ience." 100 Because scholars tend to believe that scientific facts 
play an important role in judicial decision-making, many contend 
that the Court should be more rigorous in evaluating this infor-
mation.101 While the Court tends to rely on its own unaided 
evaluations of legislative facts, 102 it could easily avail itself of 
procedural mechanisms in pursuit of factual accuracy. For exam-
ple, it could remand to lower courts for further consideration of 
the legislative facts, or it might order further briefing.103 Alter-
natively, the system could be modified to allow court-appointed 
98 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phannaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993). 
99 FED. R. EVID. 201(a) advisory committee's note; see also Lotus Dev. Corp. v. 
Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37,74 (D. Mass. 1990); United States v. Her-
nandez-Fundora, 58 F.3d 802, 812 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2288 (1995). 
100 Kenneth C. Davis, A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Conven-
ience, in PERSPECfIVES OF LAW 69, 93 (Roscoe Pound et al. eds., 1964). 
101 See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text. 
102 See Kenneth L. Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SUP. 
Cr. REv. 75, 96. 
103 See id. at 95. Under this approach, lower courts could subject legislative facts 
to a Dauben analysis and to rigorous evalution using other evidentiary rules as well. 
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experts or consultants.104 The fact that the Court does not avail 
itself of existing mechanisms and has not sought to increase its 
expertise suggests that there may be some advantage to keeping 
legislative factfinding based on judicial convenience rather than 
imposing scientific rigor. 
Second, if all legislative facts were elevated to legal principles, 
lower courts seemingly would be invited to overrule Supreme 
Court holdings if newer scientific facts demonstrated the inaccu-
racy of the Court's prior decision-even if the original scientific 
facts were rhetorical in nature. lOS This explains Pine's recogni-
tion that under present doctrine lower courts are not allowed to 
review legislative factual assumptions made by the Court in con-
stitutionallawmaking.106 If legislative facts serve a primarily rhe-
torical function, then lower courts should not be allowed to 
ignore or overrule a Supreme Court opinion because of their be-
lief that the Court used incorrect legislative facts. For example, 
while the Court may have been empirically incorrect in its as-
sumptions of legislative facts in upholding parental notification 
requirements prior to Hodgson, this error could not justify a 
lower court in overruling that decision.107 Indeed, the Supreme 
Court ultimately upheld the parental notification requirements in 
Hodgson and predictably elicited a dissent by Justice Thurgood 
Marshall based on the view that it was ignoring "a sizable and 
impressive collection of empirical data. ,,108 
Third, if the law/fact distinction were dissolved, the Supreme 
Court would be obliged to treat legislative facts like law and 
would be committed to serious empirical factfinding.109 For ex-
ample, Professors Monahan and Walker propose the dissolution 
of the law/fact distinction. Under their proposal, empirical infor-
mation would be received by courts as "social authority" relevant 
104 See Davis, supra note 40, at 1603; Appelbaum, supra note 12, at 348. 
105 Monahan and Walker would depart from the present rule that binds lower 
courts to appellate court's findings of legislative facts even if new empirical studies 
prove otherwise. They reason that new empirical studies should be received by 
lower courts like new precedent, and thus can be used to "overrule" past findings of 
legislative facts by appellate courts. See Monahan & Walker, supra note 22, at 515. 
106 See Pine, supra note 12, at 696. 
107 See supra text accompanying notes 71 and 80. 
108 497 U.S. 417, 464 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
109 Monahan and Walker propose that COurlS treat empirical research in the same 
way as legal cases. They agree with the present rule that appellate courts should not 
be bound by legislative facts determined by trial courts. Monahan & Walker, supra 
note 22, at 513-14. 
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to creating rules of law.uo In their view, courts should rely on 
empirical facts in the same way that they rely on precedent under 
the common law.u1 While this reform is of scholarly interest, it 
has not been implemented. The Court keeps intact the law/fact 
distinction. While this distinction retains vitality, the Court's cur-
rent approach merges the roles of facts and values. The Court 
sprinkles certain scientific facts in its opinions because they rep-
resent certain values in our culture. Thus, it is the fact/value dis-
tinction that has been de-emphasized, rather than the distinction 
between law and fact. 
B. Careless and Result-Oriented Usage 
Scholars have written voluminously about the Court's careless 
and result-oriented use of scientific information in constitutional 
opinions.u2 Faigman observes that "even a cursory inspection of 
the Court's constitutional cases demonstrates an uneven use of 
empirical research." 113 Faigman cites only two cases in which 
the Court conformed its conclusions to available scientific find-
ings, Brown and Roe, and he criticizes the Court's careless analy-
sis in both instances.114 He describes all other cases in which the 
Court has used scientific facts as falling into the following catego-
ries: (1) the Court conforms its conclusions to the available find-
ings; (2) the Court claims to follow scientific facts, but misapplies 
the findings; (3) the Court misunderstands or ignores valid em-
pirical research or finds it inconclusive; or (4) the Court dismisses 
the importance of a particular scientific fact and relies instead on 
some other authority. us 
Recently, Professors Donald Bersoff and David Glass have 
criticized the Court for its misuse of social science research and 
its tendency to rely instead on the "pages of human experi-
ence."116 They summarize the Court's reliance on empirical data 
in the following way: 
110Id. at 488. 
111Id. 
112 See, e.g., Bersoff & Glass, supra note 25, at 295 (1995) (noting the "almost 
century-long history of the Court's confusion and unprincipled misuse of social sci-
ence research"); THE USEINONUSE!MISUSE OF APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH IN 1HE 
COURTS (Michael J. Saks & Charles H. Baron eds., 1980). 
113 Faigman, Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding, supra note 7, at 549. 
114ld. at 565-77. 
115 ld. at 550. 
116 Bersoff & Glass, supra note 25, at 279 (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 
602 (1979)). 
HeinOnline -- 76 Or. L. Rev. 129 1997
Science as Mythology in Constitutional Law 
The Court has (1) misused or misapplied data when it believes 
the data will enhance the persusuasiveness of its opinions; (2) 
ignored or rejected data despite its assertion of empirically 
testable statements; and (3) disparaged data when the research 
does not support its views. In some cases, it has done all 
three.117 
129 
Bersoff and Glass conclude by observing the "puzzling disjunc-
tion" between the world as depicted by empiricism and the world 
as perceived by the Supreme Court.ns They believe that the 
Court's "consistent inconsistency" in using empirical research is 
likely to remain a "puzzling mystery" because of the Court's ten-
dency to refuse to explain its decisions, despite the attempts of 
many scholars to offer explanations for this phenomenon. 119 
The Court's consistently careless and result-oriented use of sci-
entific facts remains a mystery to scholars because they assume 
that the Court uses this information in a logical way. If the Court 
relies on scientific facts as clues to assist it in constitutional inter-
pretation, then it will undoubtedly be more detailed and careful 
in its analysis of empirical information. The fact that the Court 
does not do so suggests strongly that it is using scientific facts 
primarily for another purpose. 
C. The Undesirability of Heavy Reliance on Scientific Facts to 
Decide Cases 
The Court may rely primarily on scientific facts for rhetorical 
purposes because of the relative undesirability of using them in 
constitutional interpretation. The Court may be avoiding heavy 
reliance on scientific factfinding as an interpretive method be-
cause: (1) the Court is less competent than legislatures to evalu-
ate scientific facts; (2) its accuracy in interpretation may not 
necessarily be increased; (3) reliance on scientific factfinding may 
reduce the emphasis on important normative concerns; and (4) 
the Court may prefer other types of constitutional interpretation 
over a pragmatic approach that relies on scientific factfinding. 
First, the Court may feel that evaluating statutes based on sci-
entific factfinding is unwise, especially if it results in striking 
down legislation as unconstitutional. In 'McCleskey v. Kemp, the 
Court stated that legislatures were better qualified than the 
117 ld. at 293. 
l1sld. at 301-02. 
119Id. at 302. 
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Court to evaluate statistical studies.12o Legislatures and agencies 
have ready access to scientific experts and do not face the imme-
diate problems of deciding disputes.12l Furthermore, the Court's 
reliance on the adversary system may produce expert opinions 
that are highly polarized.l22 
Second, a greater reliance on scientific facts in constitutional 
interpretation would not necessarily result in greater accuracy. 
When the Court uses legislative facts, they are offered as predic-
tions about the effects of legal rules and are inherently disputa-
ble.123 While scientific facts may provide some information for 
the pragmatic balancing of desirable effects, these same facts can-
not be used to decide what effects are desirable or how much 
weight should be assigned to various factors. 124 "Good" consti-
tutional interpretation requires normative judgment and is not 
necessarily improved by better quantitation. No one has yet 
been able to devise a scientific method of valuing competing 
interests.125 
Third, the Court may wish to avoid reliance on a costlbenefit 
calculus and thus avoid the temptation to abdicate moral respon-
sibility by relying on empiricism.126 If the Court relies on a bal-
ancing test, it may tend to allow readily quantifiable variables to 
dwarf those values that are harder to measure.127 For example, if 
the Court relies heavily on quantification, values such as process, 
128 personal and group dignity, 129 and distributional concerns 130 
may be discounted. An increased emphasis on empiricism favors 
quantification over moral reasoning. 
Fmally, the Court may wish to avoid expressing a preference 
for scientific factfinding over the traditional methods of text that 
look to the constitutional, original intent, and precedent. The 
120 McQeskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987). 
121 See Sheldon L. 'ftubatch, Informed Judicial Decision-making: A Suggestion for 
a Judicial Office for Understanding Science and Technology, 10 COLUM. J. ENVIL. L. 
255, 255 (1985). 
122 See Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REv. 
595, 679 (1988). 
123 See Woolhandler, supra note 42, at 123. 
124Id. 
125 See Aleinikoff, supra note 56, at 973. 
126 See Tribe, supra note 10, at 157. 
127 C/. Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal 
Process, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1329, 1393 (1971). 
128 See Tribe, supra note 10, at 157. 
129Id. at 167. 
130 Id. at 158. 
HeinOnline -- 76 Or. L. Rev. 131 1997
Science as Mythology in Constitutional Law 131 
Court may not wish to express a preference for the kind of prag-
matic decision-making that incorporates empiricism over what 
the constitutional text, its framers, and precedent say about who 
and what we are as people and how we constitute a nation.131 
The Court does not view itself as a legislative body, but rather as 
an adjudicator in a process in which text, precedent, and legal 
principle play primary roles. 132 
The Court may therefore find it desirable to avoid heavy reli-
ance oil scientific facts in constitutional interpretation. However, 
the Court may also find it awkward to ignore empirical informa-
tion when it is presented. A court's silent avoidance of scientific 
information may create an undesirable image. Thus, the Court 
may instead incorporate scientific facts in its opinions for their 
rhetorical effect and to avoid appearing unscientific. 
III 
THE COURT'S RELIANCE ON SCIENTIFIC FACTS IS 
MORE CONSISTENT WITH 
RHETORICAL USAGE 
If scientific facts serve an evidentiary or interpretive function, 
then they may guide the Court toward particular results. In es-
sence, scholars perceive scientific facts as providing the Court 
with a clue as to what should be the proper holding. In medieval 
England, the word "clue," then spelled "clew," meant a ball of 
string. "Clew" was used repeatedly in the telling of the myth of 
the Greek hero Theseus, who killed the Minotaur on the island 
of Crete.133 Theseus, the only person to escape from the mon-
ster's deadly labyrinth, did so by retracing the string he had un-
wound when he entered. He followed the clew. Analogously, 
scholars envision the Court finding its way out of the complexity 
of cases by following a clew spun from scientific facts. This schol-
arly vision is, however, out of touch with reality. To demonstrate 
this point, I tum to notable cases which scholars rely on to show 
the evidentiary or interpretive function of scientific facts. 
Scholars often cite to five famous cases to demonstrate the 
Court's reliance on scientific facts. Some refer to Buck v. Bell as 
a prime example of this phenomenon.134 Still others cite Muller 
1311d. at 165. 
132 See Woolhandler, supra note 42, at 116. 
133 See THE. ODYSSEY OF HOMER 525 (Allen Mandelbaum trans., 1990). 
134 See, e.g., Conley, supra note 64, at 936-40 (1987). 
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v. Oregon 135 as the Court's initiation in scientific factfinding be-
cause of its reliance on the Brandeis brief.136 Brown v. Board of 
Education and Roe v. Wade are, of course, the most renowned 
cases.137 Fmally, McCleskey v. Kemp is a recent example in 
which the Court was confronted with a large empirical study. 
While scholars rely on these cases to describe the Court's logical 
reliance on science, the cases actually demonstrate that the Court 
uses scientific facts mainly for rhetorical purposes. 
A. Buck v. Bell 
Professor Conley believes that "[o]n a number of memorable 
occasions, courts facing constitutional issues have looked directly 
to the most advanced science of the time for crucial evidence, or 
even for decision-making standards. "138 He is concerned about 
the willingness of courts to tum to scientific information and to 
rely on it as "debatable premises" for constitutional decision-
making.139 He points to the case of Buck v. Belf140 as his prime 
example of this phenomenon. In that case, the U.S. Supreme 
Court upheld as constitutional a state-sponsored program of 
compulsory sterilization of the mentally retarded.141 The plain-
tiff, Carrie Buck, was a poor white woman who resided in the 
Virginia State Colony for Epileptics and Feeble Minded.142 State 
health authorities had classified her, her mother, and her daugh-
135 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
136 See generally Marion E. Doro, The Brandeis Brief, 11 V AND. L. REv. 783 
(1958). Scholars have concluded that the Court relied on the empirical evidence in 
the Brandeis brief to decide Muller. Faigman, Normative Constitutional Fact-Find-
ing, supra note 7, at 561 ("[T]he state in Muller apparently satisfied its burden by 
introducing sufficient constitutional-review facts to demonstrate a significant state 
interest."); Pine, supra note 12, at 662 (referring to the Court's reliance on Brandeis 
brief); Monahan & Walker, supra note 22, at 480-81 (noting that the Court gave 
judical cognizance to the social science facts). I believe that the Muller Court 
reached its result based on a normative, rather than empirical, judgment. Thus, its 
reference to empirical information did not document its methodology in reaching its 
conclusions but rather served a rhetorical purpose. See Part N, infra. 
137 See Faigman, Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding, supra note 7, at 565-66 
(concluding that the court heeded empirical research in Brown and Roe); Pine, 
supra note 12, at 661-62 (noting that the Court relied on social science facts in 
Brown); Monahan & Walker, supra note 22, at 484 n.24 (concluding that in Brown 
the empirical research was used to overrule a prior decision). 
138 Conley, supra note 64, at 935. 
139Id. 
140 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
141 Id. at 205-07. 
142 Id. at 205. 
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ter as "feeble minded."143 They obtained a court order for the 
sterilization of Carrie Buck under a statute allowing sterilization 
of those "afflicted with hereditary forms of insanity" when doing 
so was in "the best interests of the [patient] and society."I44 Jus-
tice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote the Court's opinion which 
upheld the statute as constitutional; in that opinion he made his 
famous declaration that "Three generations of imbeciles are 
enough."145 
According to Conley, Justice Holmes' famous remark was a 
"carefully worded statement" of his belief in a scientific theory 
that justified the compulsory sterilization of the mentally re-
tarded. l46 Conley notes that the Virginia compulsory steriliza-
tion statute was a product of the eugenics movement of the 
1920s. He traces the eugenics movement to a group of psycholo-
gists who developed empirical tests, including the Binet intelli-
gence test, at the beginning of this century. 147 Other 
psychologists thereafter used these intelligence tests and found 
striking differences among racial and ethnic groups, especially 
between those of Anglo-Saxon and Nordic ancestry-who 
tended to receive higher scores-and those who were black or 
immigrants from Southeastern Europe, who tended to perform 
the worst.l48 Although the intelligence scores also correlated 
with differences in the levels of education and linguistic skills, the 
researchers concluded that the empirical results demonstrated 
that races and ethnic groups had largely immutable intelligence 
capabilities; those who were more innately intelligent tended to 
seek better schooling and to develop more sophisticated linguis-
tic abilities.149 Researchers thus interpreted the empirical data to 
demonstrate that intelligence tests measured innate abilities and 
that intelligence was controlled by heredity. 150 On the basis of 
143Id. 
144 Act of Mar. 20, 1924, ch. 394, 1924 Va. Acts 569 (repealed 1974) (quoted in 
Conley, supra note 64, at 936). 
145 Buck, 274 U.S. at 207. 
146 Conley, supra note 64, at 935. 
147 Id. at 936. 
148 Id. at 936-37. 
149Id. 
150 Id. at 937. According to Professor Conley, this scientific theory not only 
helped fuel the eugenics movement, but also influenced contemporary legislation. 
C.c. Brigham, a Princeton psychologist, warned against the deterioration of the pub-
lic's general intelligence, which he attributed to recent immigration patterns and 
"the importation of the negro." Id. at 937 (quoting C. BRIGHAM, A STUDY OF 
AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE at xxi (1923». Legislative concern about preserving the 
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these considerations, Conley concludes that the Virginia eugenics 
sterilization statute was a product of the scientific theory under-
lying the eugenics movement. 
Conley further contends that the Court relied on the empirical 
information that informed the eugenics movement in Buck v. 
Bell,151 although the court did not cite to these empirical stud-
ies.152 The Court did state "that experience has shown that he-
redity plays an important part in the transmission of insanity, 
imbecility, etc.,,153 Furthermore, the opinion by Justice Holmes 
referred to the state court's finding that the plaintiff was "'the 
probable potential parent of socially inadequate offspring."'l54 
On the basis of this evidence Conley argues that the Court bal-
anced "the scientifically justified interests of the state against the 
interests of Carrie Buck"155 and found that "[i]t is better for all 
the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring 
for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can 
prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their 
kind."156 
While Conley provides an interesting analysis of Buck v. Bell, 
he makes assumptions about the Court's decision-making that 
cannot be based on the text of the opinion. The opinion itself 
contained no specific references to empirical or other scientific 
facts. Conley speculates that the Court relied on scientific infor-
mation from the eugenics movement, but he does not point to 
any specific scientific facts within the opinion itself. Justice 
Holmes found the state law to be constitutional because the 
Court was satisfied that the legislature which passed the statute 
general intelligence of the public mightily aided the passage of the Immigration Act 
of 1924, which put severe limits on immigration from Southeastern Europe while 
allowing increased immigration from Northern Europe. Id. at 938. A majority of 
states enacted sterilization statutes for the mentally retarded and insane. Id. See 
also STEPHEN J. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 335-36 (1981). 
151 Id. at 938-39. 
152 See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 206 (1927). 
1531d. 
154ld. at 207 (quoting lower court opinion, 130 S.E. 516,517 (Va. 1925». 
155 Conley, supra note 64, at 938-39. 
156 Buck, 274 U.S. at 207. Conley contends that this example of the Court's reli-
ance on science in Buck v. Bell revealed the danger in responding "quickly and 
decisively to science." Conley, supra note 64, at 940. He argues that courts lack the 
necessary expertise to evaluate whether fundamental theoretical premises of an en-
tire discipline are true. Id. Because science is a human endeavor, he cautions 
against creating new legal doctrine or radically altering existing doctrine even if sci-
ence may appear to demand it. Id. at 943. 
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had sufficient grounds and that adequate procedures were fol-
lowed.157 The statute purportedly promoted "the health of the 
patient and the welfare of society" because "many defective per-
sons who if now discharged [from public institutions] would be-
come a menace but if incapable of procreating might be 
discharged with safety and become self-supporting with benefit 
to themselves and to society."158 The legislative purpose of the 
Virginia statute was not unlike the Chief Justice's utterance in 
Gibbons: it could have been subject to empirical inquiry, but it is 
doubtful that any empirical information would have redirected 
the result. The "best guess" of the Virginia legislature-which 
the Court clearly was reluctant to second-guess-was that the 
mentally ill would otherwise pose a menace and cost the state 
money unless they were sterilized. 
Conley also believes that Justice Holmes' famous remark-
"Three generations of imbeciles are enough"159-underscores his 
belief in "an irrefutable scientific basis for upholding the compul-
sory sterilization."160 Yet this remark lacks the hallmarks of a 
scientific statement.161 The Court was not referring to any em-
pirical finding, but simply alluding to the lower court's findings 
regarding Carrie Buck and her genetic lineage. Justice Holmes 
made this statement to persuade the public that the Court was 
correct in its assessment. The statement referred to an adjudica-
tive fact-pertinent only to the outcome of this particular litiga-
tion-that clearly could not constitute a legislative fact that could 
be used more generally in lawmaking. The comment was rhetori-
cal; it was not factually grounded in science. Indeed, Conley ac-
knowledges that by the time the Court decided Buck v. Bell, the 
eugenics movement "had already begun to collapse as a scientific 
discipline. "162 
The next time that the Court considered the constitutionality 
of a compulsory sterilization program, it explicitly disavowed any 
reliance on scientific facts. In Skinner v. Oklahoma,163 the Court 
157 Buck, 274 U.S. at 206-07. 
158 Id. at 205-06. 
159 Id. at 207. 
160 Conley, supra note 64, at 935. 
161 For a scientific critique, see Stephen J. Gould, Carrie Buck's Daughter, 2 
CoNST. CoMMENTARY 331 (1985). Gould pointedly observes that the daughter of 
Carrie Buck did not suffer from a mental deficiency. Id. at 338. 
162 Conley, supra note 64, at 939. 
163 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
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found unconstitutional a state criminal statute that provided for 
the sterilization of persons convicted of multiple crimes of moral 
turpitude, such as those convicted two or more times of lar-
ceny.164 The statute expressly exempted embezzlement. 165 The 
petitioner's attorney presented evidence that scientific authori-
ties had demonstrated that criminal traits were not heritable. 166 
The Court stated that it did not decide the case based on this 
point, but instead relied upon the unacceptable inequality of ster-
ilizing those who commit larceny, but not those who embezzle.167 
The Court in Skinner did not overrule Buck, but distinguished it 
by stating that the issues of reproductive freedom and social ben-
efit implicated in the sterilization of "feeble-minded" persons 
justified the different result.168 The Court in Skinner thus inter-
preted Buck v. Bell as a case decided on a normative principle 
rather than as one premised on an empirical basis. 
B. Muller v. Oregon 
Professors Monahan and Walker point to the case of Muller v. 
Oregon 169 as the first instance of the Court's use of empirical 
studies as legislative facts.170 In Muller, the Court upheld an Or-
egon statute that limited the work day of any female employee in 
a factory or a laundry to ten hours. In support of the Oregon 
statute, Louis Brandeis assembled his famous brief replete with 
descriptions and references to a "substantial body of medical and 
social science research tending to show the debilitating effect on 
women of working long hours."171 Monahan and Walker con-
cede that, given the classical jurisprudence of that time, both 
Brandeis and the Muller Court conceived of this empirical infor-
mation as "facts" rather than as "law."172 However, they point to 
the Court's apparent belief that this distinction was only a legal 
formality. The majority opinion stated that the empirical infor-
164 [d. at 536. 
165 [d. 
166 [d. at 538. 
167 [d. at 539. Chief Justice Stone and Justice Jackson wrote concurring opinions 
that relied on this scientific evidence. [d. at 543 (Stone, C.J., concurring); id. at 546 
(Jackson, J., concurring). 
168 [d. at 542. 
169 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
170 Monahan & Walker, supra note 22, at 480. 
171 [d. at 480. 
172 [d. at 480 (citing Brief for the Defendant in Error at 113, Muller v. Oregon, 
208 U.S. 412 (1908». 
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mation "may not be, technically speaking, authorities,"173 but 
that nevertheless such information should receive "judicial cogni-
zance."174 Monahan and Walker understand this latter phrase to 
suggest that "even in the jurisprudential climate of 1908, some 
members of the Court believed that only 'technicalities' pre-
vented them from viewing social science research as a form of 
authority.'>l75 
The Court's reference to the Brandeis brief, however, did not 
specify what empirical information the Court found decisive. By 
making this statement, the Court acknowledged information in 
reports by various committees, bureaus, and commissions which 
may have contained some empirical information.176 But the 
Court listed this information without giving any specifics. 177 
Furthermore, the Court's remark was alluding not only to this 
kind of information but also to the foreign and domestic legisla-
tion cited by Brandeis that imposed similar restrictions on the 
working hours of women.178 Indeed, it may well have been this 
legislation that elicited the Court's remark suggesting that what 
was in the Brandeis brief was technically not legal authority gov-
erning constitutional interpretation. 
The Court in Muller made it quite clear that it was not relying 
on any specific empirical information but rather upon its general 
assessment of the facts. The Court explicitly recognized that its 
opinion about inherent sex differences was based on "widespread 
and long continued belief' and "a consensus of present public 
opinion."179 The Court then stated that it was taking "judicial 
cognizance of all matters of general knowledge. "180 Thus, it does 
not appear that the Court responded to specific empirical infor-
mation; instead, it acknowledged a long-standing cultural bias 
about the physical weaknesses of women. The Court summa-
rized the information in the Brandeis brief in the following way: 
Perhaps the general scope and character of all these reports 
[in the Brandeis brief] may be summed up in what an inspec-
tor for Hanover says: "The reasons for the reduction of the 
1731d. at 480 (emphasis added by Monahan and Walker) (citing Muller, 208 U.S. 
at 420). 
1741d. at 481 (citing Muller, 208 U.S. at 421). 
175Id. at 481. 
176 Muller, 208 U.S. at 420-21. 
177 ld. 
178 /d. at 419-20. 
1791d. at 420-21. 
180 ld. at 421. 
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working day to ten hours-(a) the physical organization of 
women, (b) her maternal functions, (c) the rearing and educa-
tion of the children, (d) the maintenance of the home-are all 
so important and so farreaching that the need for such reduc-
tion [in working hours per week] need hardly be discussed. ,,181 
In Muller, the Court clearly seemed to be responding to a gen-
eral societal bias rather than analyzing any particular scientific 
information. Scholars are thus misguided in attributing much im-
portance to the effect of scientific facts in Muller. 
Indeed, the Court's earlier decision in Lochner v. New York l82 
illustrates the relatively insignificant impact of scientific facts on 
the Court's decision-making. In Lochner the Court held uncon-
stitutional a state statute regulating the working hours of bakers 
for health reasons.183 The state presented statistics and medical 
authorities that substantiated the health dangers of prolonged 
work in bakeries.l84 The Court, however, summarily dismissed 
this information by stating that "almost all occupations more or 
less affect the health."l85 The Court did not engage in more spe-
cific discussion of these scientific facts. The Court's reference to 
scientific facts in Muller and its lack of reliance on similar facts in 
Lochner demonstrate that the Court did not base its resort to 
scientific facts on logic. The Court in Lochner ignored scientific 
facts despite having to provide justification for striking down a 
state law as unconstitutional. By contrast, in Muller, the Court 
merely had to point to some reasonable basis for upholding a 
statute and certainly did not require such scientific support as it 
cited. This result-oriented usage of scientific facts was more com-
patible with a rhetorical, rather than logical, approach. 
C. Brown v. Board of Education 
Scholars probably have devoted the largest amount of com-
mentaryl86 to the Court's famous citation to sociological studies 
181 [d. at 419-20 n.l. 
182 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
183 ld. at 64. 
184 The occupation of baker has long been known to be quite hazardous, espe-
cially because of lung disease associated with inhaling flour dust. See id. at 70-71 
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing statistics and medical authorities describing occupa-
tional health problems associated with bakery). 
185 [d. at 59. 
186 See, e.g., Faigman, Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding, supra note 7, at 
565-66; Pine, supra note 12, at 661-62; Monahan & Walker, supra note 22, at 484 
n.24; Kenneth B. Clark, The Desegregation Cases: Criticism of the Social Scientist's 
Role, 5 LAW & Soc. SCI. 224 (1959); Ernest van den Haag, Social Science Testimony 
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in footnote 11 of Brown v. Board of Education.187 The Court's 
text at the point of the footnote stated that segregation generated 
a feeling of inferiority in children in public elementary schools 
that affected their educational and mental development. ISS Chief 
Justice Earl Warren later expressed surprise that this footnote 
generated so much discussion in the academic community; he re-
portedly stated, "It was only a note, after all." 189 Scholars have 
overemphasized the significance of this citation as evidence of 
the Court's deliberative process. As the Chief Justice's remark 
indicated, the footnote did not signify that the Court's decision 
turned on this empirical finding. l90 The Court's decision in 
Brown really depended on a broader social understanding that 
"[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal."191 The 
general experience of members of the Court, and not particular 
empirical data, provided the basis for the Court's opinion on this 
matter. The Court's citation to empirical studies was what it liter-
ally appeared to be-merely a passing nod to persuasive support. 
As Sigmund Freud purportedly stated, "Sometimes a cigar is just 
a cigar." 192 
Footnote 11 in Brown has been described as "the most contro-
versial ... in American constitutional law."193 The empirical 
studies of schoolchildren by Professor Kenneth Clark, cited in 
that footnote, were subsequently heavily criticizedl94 on a 
number of methodological grounds including (1) the small sam-
ple size;195 (2) the introduction of bias from Clark's participation 
as interviewer, since he served as a science adviser to the plain-
tiffs in Brown;l96 and (3) the failure to show that the children's 
in the Desegregation Cases-A Reply to Professor Kenneth Clark, 6 VILL. L. REv. 69 
(1960); Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REv. 150, 154 (1955). 
187 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
188 [d. at 494-95 n.l1. 
189 RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation and Black America's Struggle for Equality 706 (1975). 
190 See id. (quotation by Chief Justice was meant to stress that empirical informa-
tion was "merely supportive" and not the "substance" of the holding). 
191 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
192 JOHN BARTLElT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 570 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 
1992). 
193 Paul L. Rosen, History and State of the Art of Applied Social Research in the 
Couns, in THE USEINONUsEl'MISUSE OF ApPLIED SOCIAL REsEARCH IN THE 
CoURTS, supra note 112, at 9. 
194 See, e.g., Karst, supra note 102; van den Hag, supra note 186. 
195 Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.V. L. REv. 150, 163 (1955). 
196 See id. at 159; Bersoff & Glass, supra note 25, at 294 n.109. 
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performance was related to segregation.197 
Such criticism misses the point of the Court's use of the stud-
ies. After noting that the trial court concluded that segregation 
may cause a sense of inferiority in schoolchildren that may tend 
to affect their academic and psychological development, the 
Court simply stated that "this finding is amply supported by 
modem authority."198 It then listed seven publications in a foot-
note.199 The Court did not describe these sources of authority in 
any way. It did not even state which of these sources were em-
pirical and which mere essays. The Court's approach rendered 
this information inaccessible to the reader of the Brown opinion 
by its failure to provide any analysis or description. Had the 
Court been serious about the substance of these empirical stud-
ies, it would have provided some scientific analysis. Even a basic 
analysis would have included a discussion about the potential 
roles of chance, bias, and confounding.2OO The Court's failure to 
give even a limited description of scientific facts, much less ana-
lyze its strengths or weaknesses, suggests that it did not seriously 
analyze the scientific facts. 
Had the Court's decision in Brown depended on the empirical 
findings in this footnote, we should expect courts to follow the 
scientific facts if they provided an evidentiary or interpretive ba-
sis for legal decision-making. However, neither the Supreme 
Court nor lower federal courts engaged in further empirical 
factfinding in later cases. Professor Robert Bork observed that 
the Supreme Court did not rely on empirical evidence in the per 
curiam decisions following Brown, 201 which required desegrega-
tion in public facilities other than elementary schools. If the 
Court had relied on the empirical evidence demonstrating the 
harmful effects of segregation on black children, then we would 
expect that the Court would have examined different studies in 
decisions outlawing segregation in other areas, such as public 
beaches or public golf courses. The Court did not, however, find 
it necessary to include further empirical studies regarding these 
197 See Cahn, supra note 195, at 163-64; Bersoff & Glass, supra, note 25. 
198 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
199 Id. at 494 n.l1. 
200 See CHARLES H. HENNEKINS & JULIE E. BURING, EPIDEMIOLOGY IN 
MEDICINE 243-321 (1987). 
201 Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 
IND. L. J. 1, 13 (1971). 
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matters. 202 
The Supreme Court also summarily affirmed 203 or denied cer-
tioriari to 204 lower federal court decisions that refused to change 
the course of desegregation in public facilities even when con-
fronted with opposing data suggesting that desegregation was not 
beneficial. In New Orleans City Park Improvement Association v. 
De Tiege , defendants contended that the trial court should hear 
their evidence, which purportedly showed that the psychological 
considerations present in Brown were not relevant to the segre-
gation of a public golf course and park facilities.20s The trial 
court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs and refused to 
hear this evidence. The federal court of appeals affirmed.206 It 
interpreted cases subsequent to Brown as constituting broad pre-
cedent for desegregation of public facilities based on the princi-
ple of equal protection; it thus held that the trial court was 
correct in not hearing the psychological evidence which contra-
dicted the necessity for desegregation. 207 The Supreme Court 
summarily affirmed the appellate court's holding.20B 
In Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Board of Education ,209 a 
federal district court arrived at a contrary conclusion. It first 
found that the Supreme Court's holding in Brown relied on em-
pirical factual findings that could be subject to later challenge in 
inferior courts.210 After it had heard evidence submitted by all 
litigants, the trial court concluded further that the Supreme 
Court in Brown had erred by relying on flawed. psychological 
studies.211 The trial court found that scientific evidence demon-
strated that desegregation had a harmful impact on the academic 
achievement and psychology of both black and white children.212 
Finally, the district court concluded that public schools should be 
202 [d. 
203 New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. DeTiege, 252 F.2d 122 (5th 
Cir.), affd, 358 U.S. 54 (1958). 
204 See Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 220 F. Supp. 667 (S.D. 
Ga. 1963), rev'd in part, 333 F.2d 55 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Roberts v. Stell, 
379 U.S. 933 (1964). 
205 DeTiege, 252 F.2d at 123. 
206 [d. 
207 [d. 
208 New Orleans Park Improvement Ass'n v. DeTiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958). 
209 220 F. Supp. 667 (S.D. Ga. 1963), rev'd in part, 333 F.2d 55 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied sub nom Roberts V. Stell, 379 U.S. 933 (1964). 
210 Stell, 220 F. Supp. at 678. 
211 !d. at 679-80. 
212 [d. at 668-75. 
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allowed to segregate students based on "racial traits" that are of 
"compelling educational significance.,,213 
Not surprisingly, the federal court of appeals reversed the dis-
trict court's holdings. It stated that "no inferior federal court 
may refrain from acting as required by [Brown] even if such a 
court should conclude that the Supreme Court erred either as to 
its facts or as to the law."214 The appellate court read Brown as 
proscribing segregation in public education because racially sepa-
rate but equal schools are inherently unequal,215 The Supreme 
Court denied certiorari.216 
While many scholars point to Brown as a leading case of em-
pirical jurisprudence,217 the Court's citation to empirical studies 
should not be construed as denoting the decisive reason for its 
decision. The Court did not find a need to cite to other scientific 
studies when it applied the antidiscrimination principle in Brown 
to other types of public facilities. Furthermore, after Brown the 
Supreme Court and lower federal courts did not follow the em-
pirical facts to whatever conclusions they led. Instead, it became 
clear after Brown that the legal basis for the opinion rested on a 
broader principle that segregation of public facilities was inher-
ently unequaP18 
The Court in Brown ordered the desegregation of public ele-
mentary schools despite the lower courts' findings that important 
"tangible" factors, such as quality of teachers and curricula, had . 
been equalized.219 The Court held that segregated schools were 
inherently unequal because black children developed feelings of 
inferiority that affected "their hearts and minds. "220 The Court 
knew that its desegregation decree would meet with substantial 
resistence and so it provided this explanation for the cause of the 
desegregation decree. In explaining why desegregation was nec-
213 Id. at 681. 
214 Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 333 F.2d 55, 61 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied sub nom Roberts v. Stell, 379 U.S. 933 (1964). 
2151d. 
216 Roberts v. Stell, 379 U.S. 933 (1964). 
217 See, e.g., Monahan & Walker, supra note 22, at 483-84. 
218 This view is consistent with Professor Dennis Hutchinson's history of the inner 
workings of the Court in forging a unanimous opinion in Brown. See Dennis J. 
Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decision-making in the Supreme Court, 
1948-58, 68 GEO. L.J. 1, 34-44 (1979). This history reveals that the justices did not 
decide the outcome of Brown based on empirical information. 
219 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492 & n.9 (1954). 
220 Id. at 494. 
HeinOnline -- 76 Or. L. Rev. 143 1997
Science as Mythology in Constitutional Law 143 
essary, the Court pointed to sympathetic figures-black chil-
dren-who were suffering academically and psychologically from 
segregation. It was a direct appeal to others in society to help 
these children. In a sense, the Court was turning the focus away 
from itself and giving an explanation that would invite sympathy 
from those it needed to persuade. The Court's reference to em-
pirical studies assisted further in pushing the focus away from the 
Court as the cause for the desegregation by pointing to an appar-
ently objective justification. 
The Court could have provided other explanations or meta-
phors. Indeed, the Court relied on some of the weakest evidence 
presented in the appellant's brief: the Court's footnote includes 
an article that concluded that no accurate method of proving the 
effects on segregation had yet been developed.221 The Court did 
not have to show that children were academically or emotionally 
harmed by segregation. The appendix to the appellant's brief, 
which was devoted to pertinent social science information, pro-
vided other empirical information. The Court could have con-
demned the feelings of superiority held by whites by referring to 
empirical information suggesting that segregation reinforced 
these feelings of superiority.222 But this would not have been a 
persuasive symbol. It also could have criticized segregation's 
detrimental effects on communication between racial groups,223 
but perhaps this critique would have been too abstract. The 
Court did not have to rely on any empirical information and 
could have emphasized that the unfairness associated with segre-
gation justified its conclusion.224 The Court chose instead an em-
\',\ pirical symbol that invited whites to be helpful. It did not 
criticize whites for their biases, but invited sympathy for the 
plight of black children. 
D. Roe v. Wade 
The Court in Roe v. Wade based its holding on a medical de-
scription of the trimester system.225 Physicians divide a woman's 
term of pregnancy into three periods with dividing lines at twelve 
221/d. at 494 n.ll; see K.B. CLARK, EFFEcr OF PREJuDICE AND DISCRIMINATION 
ON PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT 139 (1950). 
222 See Brief for Appellants at 8 (segregation reinforces feelings of superiority by 
whites). 
223ld. (segregation leads to blockage of communication and hostility). 
224ld. at 9. 
225 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-66 (1973). 
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and twenty-four weeks. 226 In Roe the Court focused on the divi-
sion between the first and second trimesters and the point of fetal 
viability.227 It stated that the State's interest in the health of the 
mother does not become compelling until the end of the first tri-
mester.228 The Court's explanation for choosing this point in fe-
tal development rested on what it called a "now-established 
medical fact" that up until this point "mortality in abortion may 
be less than mortality [associated with] normal childbirth.,,229 
The Court chose to make the second important delineation at the 
time of fetal viability.230 It stated that the State's interest in fetal 
life became compelling at viability and thus might justify regula-
tions designed to protect the fetus.231 Thus, the Court appeared 
to create legal tests that rested on medical information. In defin-
ing the point in time when the State may initially regulate abor-
tions, the Court in Roe stressed the importance of comparing 
maternal mortality rates associated with abortions and normal 
childbirth. 
Much as it had in Brown, the Court cited to medical authori-
ties, including scientific articles,232 medical dictionaries,233 and 
textbooks,234 to support its claim that "maternal health"235 and 
"viability"236 were important medical and legal demarcations in 
the allocation of these rights and powers. In a later case, how-
ever, the Court failed to follow through in implementing this em-
pirical test. In City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive 
Health ,237 the Court confronted "substantial" data which indi-
cated that abortions were safer than normal childbirth at up to 
226 See Carole P. Clark, Survey of Abortion Law: Perspectives of Viability, 1980 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 67, 139-42 (noting the difference between medical trimesters delinated 
by physicians, which are three equal divisions of pregnancy, and the three legal 
stages delineated by Roe). 
227 In Roe, the Court did not speak of the division between the second and third 
trimesters. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-66. Only after Roe did the Court address this 
division. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 
434-37 (1983). 




232Id. at 149 n.44. 
233Id. at 159, 160. 
234ld. at 160. 
235Id. at 163. 
236Id. at 160, 163. . 
237 462 U.S. 416 (1983). 
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sixteen weeks. 238 Instead of changing the legal demarcation 
from twelve to sixteen weeks, the Court decided to abide by the 
first/second trimester division although that division no longer 
reflected the Court's empirical reasoning in Roe .239 By so doing, 
the Court transformed the trimester system into a rigid legal con-
struct that governed abortion restrictions and no longer re-
sponded to empirical facts. The Court in Akron did not clearly 
indicate why it rejected the empirical reasoning.240 
Why did the Roe Court choose the empirical test based on 
mortality rates? The Court's choice of this metaphor may have 
to do with its emphasis on protecting the right of "the attending 
physician, in consultation with his patient" to make "his medical 
judgment."241 While the Court in Roe discussed the role of state 
regulation and mentioned the rights of the pregnant mother, it 
placed its heaviest emphasis on the right of the physician to exer-
cise his medical judgment.242 The Court chose the mortality rate 
test as an important metaphor in Roe because it served to justify 
the physician as the central decisionmaker. Who would be in a 
better position to make this calculation? 
It is ironic that Roe is widely known for declaring a woman's 
right to an abortion, because the central thrust of Roe was clearly 
aimed at protecting physicians' rights to control abortion deci-
sions. The Court chose the empirical test based on maternal 
abortion and childbirth rates because it demonstrated the power 
of physician decision-making. 
238 Id. at 429 n.l1. 
239Id. 
240 In a footnote, the Court cited to medical materials indicating that uncompli-
cated abortions generally could be performed safely in a physician's office up to 14 
weeks and that mid trimester abortions are more hazardous than earlier abortions. It 
also noted that abortion and childbirth mortality rates may be relevant when the 
State relies on a health rationale as a complete prohibition of abortions. The 
Court's rationale therefore was quite oblique and unclear. Id. In Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992), the Court gave 
this example as one of the reasons for rejecting the trimester framework entirely. 
Before that, a Court plurality had criticized the rigid application of the trimester 
approach as a "Procrustean bed." Webster v. Reproductive Health Svcs., 492 U.S. 
490,517 (1989). 
241 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). 
242 In the abortion cases after Roe, the Court reformed the constitutional right to 
encompass the mother's right to make the abortion decision. See Harold Hongju 
Koh, Rebalancing the Medical Triad: Justice Blackmun's Contributions to Law and 
Medicine, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 315, 315-16, 319-23 (1987) (describing how Justice 
Blackmun's description of the right to privacy evolved from protecting physicians' 
choices to vindicating women's rights). 
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The Court moved away from this metaphor in Akron because 
it had become clearer in the precedents after Roe that the right 
to privacy protected primarily the pregnant woman's decision.243 
The Court replaced the empirical test with a demarcation based 
on twelve weeks of gestation. Arguably, both the pregnant 
mother and the State can make this determination more readily 
as compared to the empirical test that favored the physician's 
empirical knowledge of mortality rates. Thus, the empirical test 
became less relevant as the Court's emphasis changed regarding 
the decision-making rights of pregnant women.244 
E. McCleskey v. Kemp 
In McCleskey v. Kemp, 245 the Court held that statistical evi-
dence was insufficient to prove that a state's capital punishment 
statute was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.246 The Court thus avoided the implications of an 
impressive empirical study that demonstrated that defendants in 
Georgia who were charged with killing white victims were 4.3 
times as likely to receive a death sentence in comparison to de-
fendants charged with killing black victims.247 This empirical 
finding meant that in the Georgia system race would more likely 
than not influence the decision to impose the death penalty248-
or in other words, a majority of defendants in white-victim 
crimes would not have received the death penalty if their victims 
had been black.249 
McCleskey's strongest constitutional argument rested on his 
Eighth Amendment claim alleging cruel and unusual punish-
ment.250 Under prior doctrine, the death penalty could not be 
243 See iii. at 315-16, 319-23. 
244 Similarly, the Court changed the viability determination from that which was 
within the doctor's expertise to a point which could be set by the State. In Webster, 
the Court held that the State could require doctors to assess viability at 20 weeks-
although fetuses were not viable until 24 weeks-because of the possible margin of 
error in determining the number of weeks of gestation. 492 U.S. at 515-16. 
245 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
246ld. at 308-13. In McCleskey, the Court also addressed other issues relating to 
the Equal Protection Clause. See iii. at 291-99. I address the Eighth Amendment 
claim because it was the strongest argument made by the petitioner. See infra notes 
248-56 and accompanying text. 
247 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287. 
248ld. at 328 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
249Id. 
250 Professor Faigman discusses McCleskey's Equal Protection claim, but notes 
that the Eighth Amendment claim was the stronger challenge. Faigman, Normative 
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imposed by sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk 
that the punishment would be given in an arbitrary or capricious 
manner.251 In contrast with cases reviewing equal protection 
claims, 252 in court decisions before McCleskey the defendant 
was not required to show that race affected his or her particular 
sentencing decision.253 Instead, the Court had focused on pat-
terns of arbitrary and capricious sentencing.254 The Baldus study, 
which collected data empirically describing sentencing patterns in 
the Georgia system, appeared to be exactly the kind of informa-
tion appropriate to the sort of inquiry in which the Court had 
previouslyengaged.255 To avoid the obvious implications of this 
information, the Court had to revise Eighth Amendment doc-
trine that forbade the imposition of sentencing procedures if they 
created a substantial risk that the punishment would be assigned 
in an arbitrary and capricious manner.256 Faigman observes that 
the Court manipulated the legal doctrine to render the empirical 
facts irrelevant by shifting to a particularized perspective, requir-
ing that the criminal defendant show that racial prejudice had 
affected the result in his or her individual case.257 Faigman ar-
gues that this shift in doctrine illustrates his thesis that scientific 
factfinding serves as a restraining principle of constitutional 
Constitutional Fact-Finding, supra note 7, at 598. The Court rejected McCleskey's 
Equal Protection claim by limiting the relevance of statistical studies to claims in-
volving jury venire selection and Title VII cases. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 294-95. 
The Court reasoned that in cases involving venire selection and Title VII, "the statis-
tics relate to fewer entities, and fewer variables are relevant to the challenged deci-
sions." Id. at 295. Furthermore, the Court noted that the decisionmaker has an 
opportunity to provide an explanation for any statistical disparity in cases involving 
venire selection and Title VII, while it is against public policy to have jurors or pros-
ecutors discuss their decisions in cases such as McCleskey. Id. at 2%. Finally, the 
Court decided that the petitioner had to provide something more than a statistical 
study to justify striking down criminal laws against murder and reducing the discre-
tion necessary to enforce these statutes. Id. at 297. McCleskey's Eighth Amend-
ment claim was stronger than his Equal Protection claim because the Court had not 
before required more than a showing of risk of arbitrariness and capriciousness to 
strike down a capital punishment system. Id. at 323-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
251 See, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420,427 (1980); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 
472 U.S. 320,343 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
252 See supra note 248. 
253 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 323-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Gregg v. Geor-
gia, 428 U.S. 153,200 (1976}). 
254 Id. at 323 (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 n.46). 
255 See Faigman, Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding, supra note 7, at 599. 
256 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 200. 
257 See Faigman, Normative Constitutional Factjinding, supra note 7, at 599. 
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interpretation.258 
Faigman overestimates the degree to which scientific factfind-
ing serves as a restraining and guiding principle. 259 He also 
does not describe the shoals from which these interpretive meth-
ods are supposed to be restraining or guiding us. Courts are dif-
ferent from legislatures because of their reliance on interpretive 
methods emphasizing the constitutional text and the original in-
tent of the Constitution's framers. These interpretive methods 
restrain courts from relying entirely on what Faigman would call 
their "best guess" or what most of us would describe as general 
experience. Reliance on text or original intent constitutes an in-
terpretive method because such approaches restrain the Court or 
guide the Court away from reliance merely on its general experi-
ence in deciding cases. Unless scientific factfinding can be shown 
to act similarly, then Faigman's analysis does not establish that 
this methodology constitutes an interpretive method. 
Faigman acknowledges that empirical information would never 
mandate a certain result, unlike, for example, reliance on consti-
tutional text.260 He concludes, however, that scientific facts may 
constitute an integral part of the interpretive calculus.261 
Faigman points to the Court's modification of Eighth Amend-
ment doctrine in McCleskey as an example of how constitutional 
fact-finding may act as an interpretive method.262 However, em-
pirical information has never mandated a particular result in con-
stitutional law because of its relatively weak influence in 
restraining the Court from relying on its general experience as 
the predominant source for legislative facts. McCleskey is a 
prime example. Because the Court did not want to be restrained 
or guided by statistical analysis, it held that such factual informa-
tion could not constitute an adequate basis for an Eighth 
Amendment violation. The Court gave reasons why empirical 
facts should not shape constitutional doctrine in criminal law. 
The Court stated that acceptance of McCleskey's claim would 
258 See id. at 611-13. 
259 The law/fact distinction is not just a modem formalism, despite the revision by 
Professor Davis. See generally Davis, supra note 7. The legal system does not treat 
legislative facts as "law." However, my central thesis rests on offering a descriptive 
observation about how minimally scientific facts have informed constitutional law-
making. My main disagreement with Faigman is over the degree to which scientific 
factfinding serves as a restraining and guiding principle. 
260 Faigman, Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding, supra note 7, at 607-08. 
261/d. 
2621d. 
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open up the entire criminal justice system to questioning by em-
pirical studies.263 Furthermore, legislatures were in a better posi-
tion than courts to assess empirical studies.264 While Faigman 
emphasizes that the empirical facts constitute an interpretive 
methodology because they affected constitutional law doctrine in 
McCleskey, the more direct explanation is that the Court re-
jected empirical factfinding as an interpretive methodology. Mc-
Cleskey constitutes yet another example of the Court's refusal to 
allow scientific facts to guide its constitutional interpretation. 
Faigman concludes his argument by stating that the empirical 
evidence in McCleskey forced the Court to state normative rea-
sons for rejecting these facts.265 He reasoned that this phenome-
non again demonstrates the ability of scientific facts to restrain 
and direct the Court's interpretation. Like other scholars, 
Faigman confuses the rhetoric of scientific facts with their logic. 
The Court in McCleskey felt compelled to defend its position vig-
orously to counter the strong symbolic impact of rejecting empir-
ical facts. The Court's rejection of the implicit logic that flowed 
from the empirical facts in McCleskey was hardly difficult from a 
legal standpoint because, as Faigman admits, the Court has never 
allowed scientific facts to mandate outcomes in constitutional 
law. The Court's more difficult task was persuading the public 
that it made the correct decision by ignoring the implications of 
empirical science. 
IV 
SCIENCE AS A MODERN MYTHOLOGY IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
[M]yth ... is not an explanation in satisfaction of a scientific 
interest, but a narrative resurrection of a primeval reality, told 
in satisfaction of deep religious wants, moral cravings, social 
submissions, assertions, even practicial requirements. Myth 
fulfills in primitive culture an indispensable function: It ex-
presses, enhances, and codifies belief .... [I]t . . . contains 
practical rules for the guidance of man .... [I]t is not an intel-
lectual explanation or an artistic imagery, but a pragmatic 
charter of primitive faith and moral wisdom. 
-Bronislaw Malinowski, Myth in Primitive Psychology266 
263 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 315 (1987). 
264ld. at 319. 
265 Faigman, Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding, supra note 7, at 611. 
266 ELIADE, supra note 28, at 20 (quoting BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, MYTH IN 
PRIMmVE PSYCHOLOGY 19 (1926». 
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The U.S. Supreme Court includes scientific facts in its constitu-
tional law opinions mostly for their persuasive appeal and sym-
bolic expression. Empirical results underscore the rightness of 
the legal rule announced by the Court. Scholars have mistaken 
these scientific facts as being science when in fact they are repre-
sentations of science. The function of these scientific facts is sim-
ilar to the function of facts found in mythology in primitive 
society. The facts found within myth and science may serve to 
harmonize social principles with culture. 267 Thus, scientific facts 
express, enhance, and codify legal rules in constitutional law 
cases. Mythology seeks to provide a "true" view of the world, 
something that pure rationality cannot do.268 Similarly, the 
Court uses scientific facts in its opinions as "truth," something 
that modem science does not claim to be. If "scientific" legisla-
tive facts are understood in this way, the Court's increasing reli-
ance on them suggests that the Court believes that this kind of 
rhetoric is effective in securing public acceptance of its constitu-
tional interpretations. 
If we accept that science serves as mythology in constitutional 
law, then the scholarly observations (and complaints) about the 
way that the Court uses scientific facts can be easily explained. 
Scientific facts do not guide the Court to particular results. In-
stead, the Court uses scientific facts as reassuring symbols to 
demonstrate that the legal rule is in harmony with our society's 
culture. The Court does not subject scientific facts to serious 
substantive analysis because they serve as symbols, not as empiri-
cal statements. The Court's use of scientific facts appears to be 
sloppy and often incorrect because empirical correctness is not 
the purpose of symbols. Scientific facts in judicial opinions must 
look scientific to be persuasive, but they do not have to be partic-
ularly accurate. The Court appears to be result-oriented in its 
reliance on science because it selectively chooses these facts for 
their rhetorical value. Finally, mythology exerts social authority 
on the basis not of empiricism but of sacred meanings.269 Simi-
larly, the Court invokes the sacred voice of science, not its empir-
ical correctness. 
"The root difficulty" of judicial review, according to Professor 
267 See HATAB, supra note 30, at 62 ("Myth, too, strives for a 'unity of the 
world."'); ill. at 21 ("Myth is therefore another way of saying culture"). 
268 See id. at 298. 
269 See ill. at 24. 
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Alexander Bickel, is that it "is a counter-majoritarian force in 
our system."270 Because the Court is not supposed to rely on 
polling the public to decide how to interpret the Constitution, 
one of the Court's important tasks is to persuade the public to 
obey its judgments. One of the court's rhetorical tools is the ma-
nipulation of scientific "facts." "Science is the American 
faith."271 Our society associates science with objectivity, produc-
tivity, and progress. Because nonscientists find scientific empiri-
cism and terminology inaccessible, science also has a mystique. 
Science thus resembles ancient mythology. Mythology contains 
references to the supernatural and provides sacred explanations 
that justify social order. Primitive societies relied on mythology 
to reinforce social order. 272 Myths make the world coherent and 
meaningful by describing the social order and showing why it 
came into being.273 Modern courts take on a similar task when 
faced with controversies which question the fairness of the pres-
ent social structure. 
One of the foremost experts on mythology, Mircea Eliade, ex-
plained the ways in which mythology created social harmony 
within primitive cultures. The primary function of mythology, 
according to Eliade, is to provide "models for human behavior 
and, by that very fact, [it] gives meaning and value to life.,,274 
Similarly, the important role of scientific facts in the Court's 
opinions is to encourage public acceptance of legal rules that reg-
ulate its activities and to assign these rules meaning and value. 
For example, in Muller v. Oregon the Court was not appealing to 
the public's scientific knowledge when it referred to the empirical 
studies cited in the Brandeis brief showing the detrimental effect 
of long working hours on women. Instead, the Court was provid-
ing emotional-not necessarily logical-reassurance to the gen-
eral public that this paternalistic approach was the right one. 
Scientific facts serve to reaffirm the rightness of constitutional 
rules by providing emotional reassurance for an intuition. 
Eliade advises us that "the myth is regarded as a sacred story, 
and hence a 'true history,' because it always deals with reali-
ties .'>275 By "realities" Eliade means that the truth of myths 
270 BICKEL, supra note 34, at 16. 
271 John Veilleux, The Scientific Model in Law, 75 GEO. L.J. 1967, 1967 (1987). 
272 See AUSBAND, supra note 29, at 2-5. 
273 See id. 
274 ELIADE, supra note 28, at 2. 
275 Id. at 60. 
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comes from observation of what presently exists.276 Myths ex-
plain how we became mortal and sexed, and they reflect a "true 
history" because we can observe that we are now mortal and 
sexed. The Court quite similarly tends to use scientific facts in 
ipso facto fashion. For example, Professor Clark's study in 
Brown v. Board of Education did not look at the effects of segre-
gation; instead, it simply compared the performance of black and 
white schoolchildren. Nevertheless, the Court cites to Clark's 
study as evidence of how school segregation affected the per-
formance and psychology of black children.277 Thus, the fact that 
Clark found that black children did not score as well as white 
children was assumed to be the historical result of school segre-
gation. Mythology relies on the reality of the present to affirm 
the truth of its narrative.278 By functioning as mythology, scien-
tific facts in court opinions do not invite analysis. Instead, they 
ask us to accept the underlying premises of legal rules as truth. 
Myth "gives man ... the illusion that he can understand the uni-
verse and that he does understand the universe."279 
CONCLUSION 
During this century, the Court's growing propensity for using 
scientific facts in its constitutional law opinions suggests a deep-
felt wish by the Court to be perceived as capable of analyzing 
abstruse and objective information. The Court thus may hope to 
be perceived as herculean: 
Herakles was the Greek Superman, and many of the stories of 
his deeds are simply gripping tales of superhuman achieve-
ments and fabulous monsters. At the same time Herakles, like 
Odysseus, stands for the average man, and his adventures are 
exaggerated parables for human experience .... [O]n the 
whole his example was to be emulated, for he destroyed evil 
and championed good, rising above all the blows that fortune 
showered on him'?B° 
The Court's wish to be perceived as scientific is part of a long-
standing tradition. Legal scholars of the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries envisioned law as being susceptible to the same 
276Id. 
277 See Cahn, supra note 193, at 163-64. 
278 See ELIADE, supra note 28, at 11. 
279 CLAUDE L~VI-STRAUSS, MYTH AND MEANING 17 (1979). 
280 LUCILLA BURN, THE LEGENDARY PAST: GREEK MYTHS 24 (1990). Of course, 
the notion of "judge as Hercules" suggests RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 239-
40 (1986). 
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forms of analysis and investigation that were believed to guide 
the natural sciences.281 Christopher Langdell, dean of the 
Harvard Law School, believed that the development of natural 
law was akin to the discovery of scientific natural principles. 282 
Of course, scholars have criticized Langdell's methodology as not 
really scientific because it requires subjectivity in selecting cor-
rect cases and then using appropriate rules to evaluate other 
cases.283 
In the late nineteenth century, Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Jr., declared that the "black-letter man" would give way to the 
"man of statistics and the master of economics." 284 Professor 
Roscoe Pound urged law students and lawyers to "look to eco-
nomics and sociology and philosophy, and cease to assume that 
jurisprudence is self-sufficient." 285 The era of sociological juris-
prudence helped lead to what became known as legal realism.286 
Legal realism embraced the impact of empiricism on the evolu-
tion of law. In response to this evolution of legal thought, the 
Court has increasingly included scientific and empirical facts in 
constitutional law opinions in this century. Thus, classical juris-
prudence gave way to sociological jurisprudence and then legal 
realism; during all these eras, science fascinated scholars and 
courts. This essay suggests that the Court's use of scientific facts 
in its constitutional opinions actually does not mean that scien-
tific factfinding has become an important interpretive method. 
Facts have not become indistinguishable from law. Instead, facts 
and the methodology of law continue to be a mythology. 
281 See Veilleux, supra note 271, at 1974. 
282 See id. at 1975. 
283 See id. at 1976. 
284 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 
(1897). 
285 Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REv. 12, 35-36 
(1910). 
286 See generally G. Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: 
Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. 
REv. 999, 1000-26 (1972). For a description of how some scholars devoted to legal 
realism undertook empirical studies to inform their scholarship, see John Henry 
Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: The Singular Case 
of Underhill Moore, 29 BUFFALO L. REv. 195,293-294 (1980). 
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